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Abstract
This paper reports an experiment realised with 850 electors during
the 2017 French presidential election. It tested a ballot di¤erent from
the o¢ cial one. Instead of voting for a unique candidate, participants
were asked to cast one vote on each candidate. The vote could be "in
favor", "neutral" or "against". The theoretical advantages of such a
ballot are discussed and tested empirically.
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1 Introduction
Distrust of political parties is spreading across countries (Dalton andWeldon,
2005) and has continued to grow during the recent crisis (Armingeon and
Guthmann, 2014). In general this dissatisfaction cannot be explicitely voiced
in elections. One exception is the "none of the above" possibility. It is o¤ered
in the State of Nevada (Damore et al., 2012); Russia during the period 1993-
2006 (McAllister and White, 2008); and India since 2013 (Diwakar, 2015).
Another exception consists in allowing electors to cross o¤ the names of those
against whom they wish to vote. This possibility was o¤ered in the former
Soviet Union (Hahn, 1988) or in some Chinese villages (Zhong and Chen,
2002). It also exists in French municipal elections, but only in villages of fewer
than 1,000 inhabitants. When dissatisfaction cannot be explicitely voiced it
is indirectly expressed, through abstentions (exit option), invalid votes, votes
for populist or extreme parties (voice option) or vote for a mainstream party
(loyalty option). The main disadvantage of these options is that they do
not send a clear signal: for instance abstention may be due to desinterest or
dissatisfaction; the votes received by a candidate may be in his or her favor
or against the competitor.
Clear messages of dissatisfaction can be found in elections. Consider the
two-round French presidential elections. Voters are allowed to vote for a
unique candidate at each round. The second round takes place two weeks
after the rst one and opposes the two candidates with the largest numbers of
votes. The number of invalid votes are always more numerous at the second
round than at the rst one. The additional invalid votes can be interpreted
as voices of dissatisfaction with the second round competitors. The 2002
election provides a well-known example of dissatised electors choosing the
loyalty option. In that election, sixteen candidates were present at the rst
round. Too many left-wing electors took for granted that the socialist can-
didate would anyway be selected for the second round and voted for other
candidates. As a result all left-wing candidates were eliminated. More than
three fths of the total electorate voted for the conservative candidate at the
second round. Many of these votes were cast against his opponent (whose
party is considered as extreme). Dissatisfaction can also be found in the 2017
election. The second round exhibits the largest percentage of invalid votes
on record and the second largest percentage of abstention (the largest was
obtained in 1969). On the 7th of May 2017, four millions of French citizens
bore the cost of electoral participation to cast a null or blank vote.
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Social choice theory advocates for alternative electoral systems that in-
crease the voterscapacities to express their preferences. Some of them were
experimented during the 2002, 2007 and 2012 French presidential elections.
All tested ballots di¤er from the o¢ cial one. One experimental ballot asks
voters to rank all candidates (Favarque, Jayet and Ragot, 2011); while all
others ask voters to assign each candidate a grade chosen within a given set.
Balinski et al. (2003) tested approval ballots, i.e. the grade is chosen within
set {approval, non approval}. Baujard and Igersheim (2011) repeated the
experiment with approval ballots and tested ballots with a set of numerical
grades, {0,1,2}. Those ballots and two new ballots, respectively with sets
{-1,0,1} and {0,1,...,20} were tested in Baujard et al. (2014). Balinski and
Laraki (2011) tested ballots with a set of qualitative grades, {excellent, very
good, good, acceptable, poor, to reject}. Experiments have also been realised
in other countries: Germany (Alós-Ferrer and Grani´c, 2012); Benin (Kabre,
Laslier, Van der Straeten, and Wantchekon, 2013); Romania (Roescu, 2014)
and Austria (Darmann, Grundner and Klamler, 2017).
All those experiments yield the following conclusions concerning the choice
of ballots. Ranking all candidates appears to be di¢ cult (see Favarque et
al., 2009; Popov et al., 2014;1 and Darmann et al., 2017). By contrast par-
ticipants enjoy the possibility of choosing a grade for each candidate. Bal-
lots with three grades are preferred to ballots with two grades but choosing
among twenty-one grades is too complicated (Baujard et al., 2013). Partici-
pants attach meaning to numerical grades and do not consider that the sets
{-1,0,1} and {0,1,2} are equivalent (Igersheim et al., 2016). Balinski and
Laraki (2014) give further arguments in favor of qualitative grades.
This paper reports an experiment realised during the 2017 French presi-
dential election with a ballot with three qualitative grades. Voters are asked
to cast one vote on each candidate. The vote can be "in favor", "neutral"
or "against". This ballot, referred to as approval and disapproval ballot, has
several advantages compared with the o¢ cial one. Two advantages are com-
mon to all ballots where each candidate receives a grade. First, more exible
options are o¤ered: a voter can still vote in favor of a unique candidate but
other possibilities also exist. Second, supporters of marginal candidates do
not face the traditional dilemma of the rst round: either to express support
1Regenwetter, Kim, Kantor and Ho (2007) and Popov, Popova and Regenwetter (2014)
study the presidential election of the American Psychological Association where voters
rank all candidates.
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for the most preferred marginal candidate or to cast a useful vote for a less
preferred candidate. The elimination of the socialist candidate in the 2002
election demonstrated that this choice could have important consequences.
Compared with the ballots tested in the previous elections, the approval and
disapproval ballot o¤ers an explicit means to express dissatisfaction with the
vote "against". The three qualitative grades have a common interpretation.
The grade "in favor" corresponds to a positive opinion; the grade "against"
corresponds to a negative opinion; and the grade "neutral" permits to express
indi¤erence and draws the frontier between positive and negative evaluations.
Reducing the number of grades to three avoids the di¤erences of interpre-
tation that arise whenever several positive or negative grades are proposed.
For instance what a voter requires for the grade "excellent" may be what
another voter requires for the grade "very good".
This experiment was realised on April 23 (rst round of the 2017 elec-
tion) in the city of Allevard-les-Bains. It was both a scientic project and
a citizen initiative. Electors were invited to the experimental voting station
once they had cast their o¢ cial vote. Three di¤erent voting rules using the
disapproval and disapproval ballot were tested: the Dis&approval rule (Al-
cantud and Laruelle, 2014) and two of its variants. Each participant tested
one at random.
Participants were satised with the ballot. The o¢ cial ballot forced many
left-wing voters to choose between the socialist candidate and another left-
wing candidate ahead in polls. This generated a dilemma as polls were also
suggesting that both candidates could be eliminated at the rst round. In
the experiment voting in favor of both was possible. As a result the socialist
candidate received many votes "in favor" in the experiment while he scored
very poorly at the o¢ cial election. That is, his o¢ cial score reects a strategic
choice rather than a lack of support. Participants were also very happy
with the possibility of voting against candidates and used it intensively. In
particular, two of the main candidates, the conservative one and the second
round loser, received many votes "against".
Concerning the outcome, the nding of the experiment is that the three
rules tested yield the same winner. Additionally, the ranking of the ve
main candidates is identical under the three rules. Remarkingly enough, the
ranking of the ve main candidates is not modied either when other rules
using ballots with three qualitative grades are applied to the data. An identi-
cal ranking is obtained with the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination procedure
(Y¬lmaz, 1999), the threshold rule (Aleskerov, Yakuba and Yuzbashev, 2007)
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or the majority judgement with three grades (Balinski and Laraki, 2007).
This robust nding permits to formulate a conjecture that would disantangle
opposite conclusions drawn from di¤erent experiments. On the one hand
Regenwetter et al. (2006) argue that di¤erent outcomes due to di¤erent elec-
toral rules hardly occur in real-world situations. This is illustrated in the
analysis of the presidential election of the American Psychological Associa-
tion (Regenwetter et al., 2007, and Popov et al., 2014). On the other hand
the above mentioned French and German experiments conclude that di¤er-
ent rules using di¤erent ballots lead to di¤erent outcomes. The conjecture
is that what really matters is the ballot which amounts for the information
collected. It can then be expected that in real-world situations rules using
di¤erent ballots, i.e. collecting di¤erent amounts of information, may eas-
ily yield to di¤erent outcomes. By contrast rules using di¤erent ballots will
rarely2 yield di¤erent outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
outcomes of the o¢ cial election. Section 3 presents the experiment and the
participants. Section 4 analyses the experimental voting behavior. Section 5
gives the outcomes of the experiment and discusses their robustness. Section
6 concludes.
2 O¢ cial election at Allevard-les-Bains
The presidential election in France is a two-round run-o¤, with a unique
district. Eleven candidates competed in the 2017 presidential election. Fol-
lowing the o¢ cial order of presentation, these were: Nicolas Dupont-Aignan
(Debout la France), Marine Le Pen (Front National), Emmanuel Macron
(En Marche), Benoit Hamon (Parti Socialiste), Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte
Ouvrière), Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste), Jacques Chem-
inade (Solidarité et Progrès), Jean Lassalle (Résistons), Jean-Luc Mélenchon
(La France Insoumise), François Asselineau (Union Populaire Républicaine)
et François Fillon (Les Républicains).
It can be said that there were ve main competitors: M. Le Pen (MLP), E.
Macron (EM), B. Hamon (BH), J.L. Mélenchon (JLM) and F. Fillon (FF).
Their respective possibilities were described as follows by J. Rothwell and
2An example is the experiment realised on single transferable vote (Favarque et al.,
2011), where the Hare and the Coomb methods lead to di¤erent outcome.
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H. Samuel in the Telegraph 3: "French elections are usually a two-horse race
between the conservative Les Republicains (formerly the UMP) and the Left-
wing Socialist Party. But for this years election, the goalposts have moved.
François Hollandes Socialist Party is in tatters after a disastrous term that
has made him one of the least popular presidents in the countrys history.
And with Les Republicains François Fillon smarting from the scandal over
claims he paid his wife thousands of euros to do a ctitious job, his victory
is no longer a foregone conclusion. Much ink has also been spilled over the
possibility that Marine Le Pen could ride to the Élysée Palace on a wave of
populism. Only one Front National (FN) presidential candidate has made
it to the second round Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002. His daughter Marine
is virtually assured of doing so, current polls suggest, but her chances of
winning the run-o¤ remain highly unlikely. Mr Macron has emerged in recent
weeks as the clear favourite to win the second round runo¤, but nothing is
set in stone. (...) The surprise fourth man of the presidential campaign,
Communist-backed radical Jean-Luc Mélenchon is polling to beat Socialist
candidate Benoît Hamon as the top choice of the Left."
In the rst round E. Macron obtained 8,657,326 votes; M. Le Pen 7,679,493
votes, F. Fillon 7,213,797 votes, J.L. Mélenchon 7,060,885 votes and B. Ha-
mon 2,291,565 votes. The candidate ranked at the sixth position was N.
Dupont-Aignan with 1,695,186 votes. The other candidates obtained fewer
than 500, 000 votes. E. Macron was opposed to M. Le Pen at the second
round and was elected.
Allevard-les-Bains is a city located in the Department of Isère, in the
region of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes with 2969 registered voters for the 2017
presidential election. At the rst round 2308 electors showed up at the voting
station. Table 1 gives the result of their rst round vote. Candidates are
denoted by their initials; "bn" stands for a blank or a null vote.
NDA MLP EM BH NA PP JC JL JLM FA FF bn
132 442 507 146 10 27 2 27 575 31 351 58
(%) 6 19 22 6 1 1 0 1 25 1 15 3
Table 1: First round results at Allevard-les-Bains
3Consulted December 13, 2017
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/french-presidential-election-2017-does-work-
candidates/
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As can be seen from Table 1, the results are not representative of those of
France. The ranking of three of the main competitors is di¤erent: here J.L.
Mélenchon arrives rst, E. Macron arrives second, and M. Le Pen is third.
As in France F. Fillon is fourth and B. Hamon fth.
3 Description of the experiment
The experiment realised in Allevard-les-Bains was a citizen initiative super-
vised by researchers. It involved around twenty volunteers from the city. Its
procedure follows the protocol of the previous experiments realised during
the French presidential elections. An o¢ cial letter was sent to every reg-
istered voter at home. It informed that a scientic vote experiment would
take place on the election day. The experimental ballot and the rules tested
were described. Citizens were also invited to a public conference on the ex-
periment. On the election day volunteers encouraged electors to participate
to the experiment at the exit of the o¢ cial voting station and explained, if
necessary, how to ll the ballot. The o¢ cial and experimental voting stations
o¤ered identical voting conditions (same opening hours, cabin booths, list of
electors, checking the identity, urns).
On the experimental ballots the names of the eleven candidates were
printed, with three boxes per name: one "in favor", one "neutral" and one
"against". Participants were asked to tick one box per candidate. It was
stated that if one box was left empty, it would be counted as an "against"
vote. It was also specied that ballots would be considered as invalid if more
than one box per candidate was ticked. There was a small questionnaire on
the back of the ballot: the questions were on their o¢ cial vote and gender.
Each participant received at random a green, blue or yellow ballot. The
colour of the ballot determined the rule experimented. Participants with a
blue ballot tested the Dis&approval rule (Alcantud and Laruelle, 2014); those
with a green or yellow ballot tested two variants of this rule. On all ballots it
was precised that candidates would obtain one point for each "in favor" vote
received and that a certain number of points would be withdrawn for each
"against" vote. It was stated on the blue ballots that the number of point
withdrawn would be one. This number was half on the green ballots and two
on the yellow ballots. The candidate with the largest number of points was
elected.
Volunteers reported that it was sometimes di¢ cult to convince electors
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to participate: 859 of 2308 electors came to the experimental voting station.
By contrast it was easy to explain how to ll the ballot. Only 9 participants
ticked more than one box per candidate. We have thus a set of 850 valid
ballots: 247 green ballots, 280 blue ballots, 307 yellow ballots and 16 let-
ters of information used as ballot (this possibility had been allowed). The
huge majority of participants answered the questionnaire. This lead to the
following information. More women participated: 433 of them answered the
gender question while 366 men did. All candidateselectors are represented
among the participants. Those of J.L. Mélenchon are the more numerous
(256 of them) while one elector of J. Cheminade participated. Table 2 gives
each candidates number of electors for the 808 participants who reported
their vote at the o¢ cial election.
NDA MLP EM BH NA PP JC JL JLM FA FF bn
55 79 201 79 4 10 1 5 256 19 94 8
(%) 7 10 25 10 0 1 0 0 32 2 12 1
TABLE 2: distribution of participants according to the o¢ cial vote
Participants are not representative of the electorate of Allevard-les-Bains,
as can be concluded from the comparison of the percentages of Table 1 and
Table 2. The electors of N. Dupont-Aignan, B. Hamon, E. Macron and J.L.
Mélenchon are proportionally more represented in the set of participants than
in the electorate of Allevard-les-Bains. The opposite holds for the electors of
M. Le Pen or F. Fillon. This lack of representation prevents us from making
any comparison between the o¢ cial vote and the experimental one.
4 Voting behavior
The o¢ cial ballot represented a dilemma for many 2017 French electors.
Voters have to choose a single candidate and the 2002 election taught them
to be strategic. Participants enjoyed the new expressive possibilities o¤ered
by the experimental approval and disapproval ballot. Some comments were:
"with this ballot we can at last vote with the heart" or "voting with this ballot
is a relief". Participants generally decided to transmit more information than
the one they are usually asked. Only 45 participants chose to cast a ballot
that would be equivalent to the o¢ cial one. That is, 45 participants voted
in favor a single candidate and cast a vote against (or neutral vote) all other
candidates.
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It is also worth noting that most participants used the three possible
votes. The neutral vote is used by 735 participants. That is, the ballots
lled go beyond what would be an approval vote. This empirical evidence
contradicts Felsenthal (1989)s theoretical conclusion that no rational voter
chooses a neutral vote because it is a dominated strategy.
Participants were especially satised of being o¤ered the opportunity to
vote against candidates. Most participants cast more "against" votes than
"in favor" votes. Participants appreciated the possibility of voting in favor
several candidates, although more than 30% of the participants (256 out of
850) cast a single "in favor" vote. Around 50% of the participants cast two
or three "in favor" votes. The dispersion is larger for the number of votes
"against" cast.
On average, the 11 votes cast by a participant are distributed as follows:
2.3 "in favor" votes; 5.7 "against" votes and 3 neutral votes. Table 3 gives
the average distribution of the 11 votes for the whole sample of the 850
participants; for those who lled a green, blue, or yellow ballot; and for male
or female participants.
All 850 Green Blue Yellow Women Men
"in favor" 2:3 2:4 2:3 2:3 2:3 2:3
neutral 3 3 3 3 3 2:9
"against" 5:7 5:6 5:7 5:7 5:7 5:8
TABLE 3: Average numbers of votes cast according to the colour and gender
As can be seen from the table participants behave similarly whatever
the colour of the ballot. This means that the rule has no impact on how a
participant distribute the votes. We could have expected that the larger the
number of point withdrawn in case of "against" vote, the smaller the number
of "against" votes. This does not hold: the average number of "against"
votes among yellow ballots is not smaller than among the green ballots.
Participants had no incentive to vote strategically. It was also the rst time
that they were using these ballots, so no strategic learning may have taken
place.4 At the public meeting a question addressed by a participant was:
Why should we vote di¤erently according to the number of points assigned
to a "against" vote? Women and men also behave similarly.
4By contrast strategic choices (popularly referred to as "useful vote") are common in
the o¢ cial elections, especially since 2002.
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By contrast the averages di¤er according to the vote reported at the
o¢ cial election. Table 4 gives the average number of "in favor", neutral and
"against" votes cast by the participants who are electors of the six main
candidates.5
NDAs MLPs EMs BHs JLMs FFs
Votes electors electors electors electors electors electors
"in favor" 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:3 2:6 2
neutral 3:7 2:5 3 3:1 2:9 2:5
"against" 5:2 6:3 5:9 5:6 5:5 6:5
TABLE 4: Average numbers of votes cast according to the o¢ cial vote cast
Here the di¤erences are more substantial: the average number of "in favor"
votes varies between 2 and 2.6; the average number of "against" votes be-
tween 5.2 and 6.5; and the average number of neutral votes between 2.5
and 3.7. These di¤erences are consistent with the political landscape: there
were more left-wing candidates than right-wing candidates, and thus left-
wing electors (that is, B. Hamon or J.L. Mélenchons electors) cast more "in
favor" votes than the other electors. It is worth noting that F. Fillon or M.
Le Pens electors cast more "against" votes than the other electors.
Among the electors of a candidate we can compute the percentage of
them who vote in favor this candidate. We obtain a percentage of 0.98 for N.
Dupont-Aignan; 0.92 for M. Le Pen; 0.95 for E. Macron; 1 for B. Hamon; 0.98
for J.L. Mélenchon; and 0.97 for F. Fillon. These very large proportions show
that participants took the experiment seriously and voted consistently with
their o¢ cial vote. Moreover not voting in favor of the candidate for whom
they voted at the o¢ cial election is not necessarily an misunderstanding of
the approval-disapproval ballot. Some participants warned us that the vote
at the o¢ cial election had been a strategic choice, while the answer to the
experiment would be sincere.6
5The averages are done for the sets of ballots that represent at least 5% of the partici-
pants, i.e. if we had at least a sample of 43 ballots.
6This explains why these participants considered the experimental rule as a relief com-
pared to the o¢ cial rule.
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5 Results of the experiment
Given that there is no substantial di¤erence of voting behavior according to
the rule tested, we consider the whole sample of valid ballots.7 Table 5 gives
the distribution of 850 votes received by the di¤erent candidates.
NDA MLP EM BH NA PP JC JL JLM FA FF
"in favor" 191 131 303 322 133 169 31 77 401 59 146
neutral 227 78 215 247 309 277 297 325 177 273 83
"against" 432 641 332 281 408 404 522 448 272 518 621
TABLE 5: Numbers of votes received by the di¤erent candidates
Two candidates (J.L. Mélenchon and B. Hamon) receive more "in favor"
votes than "against" votes; J.L. Mélenchon is even close to receiving 50% of
"in favor" votes. This candidate dominates all others, in the sense that he
has at the same time the largest number of "in favor" votes and the smallest
number of "against" votes.
Two of the ve main candidates, F. Fillon and M. Le Pen, receive very
large numbers of "against" votes, much more than little known candidates do.
It is also worth noting that little known candidates receive more "against"
votes than neutral votes.
What this table does not show is that the participants who voted in favor
of F. Fillon, M. Le Pen or E. Macron are generally participants who cast
a few "in favor" votes. For instance 57% of the "in favor" votes received
by F. Fillon were cast by participants casting one or two "in favor" votes.
By contrast the participants who voted in favor of little known candidates
(J. Cheminade, J. Lassalle, F. Asselineau, N. Arthaud, and P. Poutou) are
rather participants who cast at least 4 "in favor" votes. N. Dupont-Aignan,
B. Hamon and J.L. Mélenchon obtain the majority of their "in favor" votes
from participants who cast 2 or 3 votes "in favor".
Another point worth mentioning is that participants who cast few votes
"against" generally vote "against" F. Fillon and M. Le Pen. For instance, 22
participants out of the 26 participants who cast a single "against" vote, cast
it "against" F. Fillon or M. Le Pen. Out of the 48 participants who cast two
"against" votes, 40 vote "against" F. Fillon and 37 against M. Le Pen.
7Note that if we consider each subset of a given colour the results are not substantially
di¤erent: the ranking of the ve main candidates is basically identical. In particular the
winner never changes.
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We then compute the respective scores of the candidates for the three
rules that were tested. A candidates score with the Semi-Dis&approval
(SD) rule is the di¤erence between the number of votes "in favor" the can-
didate and half the number of votes "against" the candidate. It is the dif-
ference between the numbers of votes "in favor" and the votes "against"
with the Dis&approval (D) rule; and it is the di¤erence between the num-
ber of votes "in favor" and twice the number of votes "against" with the
Double-Dis&approval (DD) rule. Candidates are then ranked according to
their score. The results are given in Table 7.
We can compare these rankings with the rankings that would be obtained
with other rules that deal with approval-disapprovals ballots. The Threshold
(T) rule (Aleskerov, Yakuba and Yuzbashev, 2007) ranks candidates accord-
ing to the number of votes "against": the smaller this number the better. In
case of tie, the number of "in favor" votes are compared: the larger this num-
ber the better. What can be referred to as Lexicographical Approval (LA)
ranks candidates according to the number of "in favor" votes (the larger this
number, the better). In case of a tie, a candidate with a smaller number of
"against" votes is considered as better. This is a lexicographical extension
of the approval rule for approval-disapprovals ballots (Brams and Fishburn,
1978). The rankings for these two rules are given in Table 7.
The majority judgement (Balinski and Laraki, 2007) with three grades
associates to each candidate her or his median evaluation (here, "in favor",
neutral or "against"). The "candidates majority gauge" (see Balinski and
Laraki, 2011, p. 24 - 25) and a tie breaking rule permits to provide a complete
ranking of all candidates. The results for the experiment is given in Table 7.
Y¬lmaz (1999) proposes the Approval-Condorcet-Elimination procedure.
This rule is based on pair-wise comparisons of candidates. A voter is said to
strictly prefer a candidate to another if the voter casts a vote "in favor" the
rst candidate but not "in favor" the second or if the voter casts a neutral vote
for the rst candidate and "against" the second. For each pair of candidates
we count how many voters strictly prefer one to the other. The candidate
with the largest number is globally preferred to the other one. The results
for the experiment are given in Table 6, which reads as follows. The value
148 in row BH and column JLM gives us the number of participants who
strictly prefer BH to JLM. We compare this value to, 216, the one in row
JLM and column BH. We conclude that J.L. Mélenchon is globally preferred
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to B. Hamon.
NDA MLP EM BH NA PP JC JL JLM FA FF
NDA 0 299 208 222 265 261 277 258 198 261 289
MLP 88 0 140 159 164 168 165 162 131 152 134
EM 356 446 0 230 363 355 412 392 247 416 412
BH 397 504 262 0 334 322 438 400 148 432 492
NA 280 372 214 87 0 76 266 238 80 278 387
PP 289 388 219 102 111 0 286 254 74 294 394
JC 117 242 127 87 238 97 0 78 76 94 252
JL 178 304 171 136 159 157 180 0 122 181 297
JLM 425 502 328 216 395 353 487 446 0 468 495
FA 111 237 147 112 134 131 111 103 89 0 239
FF 113 158 120 176 198 199 193 179 166 184 0
Table 6 Matrix of preferences in the ACE-procedure
We observe in the table that J.L. Mélenchon is preferred to all other can-
didates. In turn the B. Hamon is preferred to all other candidates but J.L.
Mélenchon. We obtain a complete8 ranking of candidates which is given in
Table 7.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
LA JLM BH EM NDA PP FF NA MLP JL FA JC
SD JLM BH EM NDA PP NA JL FF MLP FA JC
D JLM BH EM PP NDA NA JL FA FF JC MLP
DD JLM BH EM PP NDA NA JL FA JC FF MLP
T JLM BH EM PP NA NDA JL FA JC FF MLP
MJ JLM BH EM PP NA NDA JL FA JC FF MLP
ACE JLM BH EM PP NA NDA JL FA JC FF MLP
Table 7: Ranking of the candidates with the di¤erent rules.
The rankings provided by the rules are rather consistent. The ve main
competitors appear in the same relative positions. This is an extremely
robust results given that the other candidates were much less known. The
rst three candidates are always ordered as follows: J.L. Mélenchon rst, B.
8The ranking obtained by the ACE-procedure is not necessarily complete as it is the
case here.
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Hamon second and E. Macron third. The other two main candidates come
far behind. In most rules, M. Le Pen is last and F. Fillon is last but one. In
fact M. Le Pen is not ranked last in the Lexicographical Approval (LA) or
the Semi-Dis&Approval (SD), the two rules that give more importance to a
vote "in favor" than to a vote "against". We can conclude that M. Le Pen
and F. Fillon are much disapproved.
A detailed analysis of the data of the experiment suggests that some
voters used the number of "in favor" votes or "against votes" in order to
express some intensity of preferences. A rule that would take into account
this information may deserve some theoretical study.9 As a rst step in this
direction we made the following exercise. In the dis&approval rule a vote "in
favor" a candidate is worth one point and a vote "against" is worth minus one
point. Instead a "in favor" vote is weighted by the number of "in favor" votes
cast by the participant (as long as this number is not zero). For instance if
a participant casts a single "in favor" vote, this vote amounts for one, if a
participants casts two "in favor" votes each of them will amount for half,
etc. Similarly a vote "against" can be weighted by the number of "against"
votes cast by the participant. We then sum the weighted votes and obtain a
modied score for each candidate. J.L. Mélenchons modied score remains
the largest of all candidates. Among the ve main competitors, the of M. Le
Pens modied score remains the smallest and F. Fillons one is the smallest
but one. By contrast the ranking of E. Macron and B. Hamon would be
reversed.
6 Conclusion
Participants took the experiment seriously: ballots were lled consistently
with the o¢ cial vote reported. They enjoyed the option of voting in favor of
several candidates and were especially satised of being o¤ered the opportu-
nity to vote against candidates. The three possible votes ("in favor", neutral
and "against") per candidate were considered as very intuitive and su¢ cient
to express their political opinion. In sum, this eld experiment resulted in a
democratic experience. Participants were happy to discuss electoral systems
from a scientic perspective. Some of them learnt that alternative systems
were possible and used in di¤erent countries. Even electors who cast a blank
or null vote at the o¢ cial election decided to participate and cast a valid
9This rule may have more strategic aspects than the others.
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vote at the experiment. It can thus be inferred that the use of approval and
disapproval ballots may boost electoral participation.
The political o¤er and more generally the political actors behaviour
would also be modied with alternative ballots. In order to win the elec-
tion with the o¢ cial ballot, a candidate has to convince electors to vote in
her or his favor. With an approval and disapproval ballot candidates would
also have to convince the rest of the electorate not to vote against them.
Opposition to the adoption of these ballots may thus be expected. But some
political interest nevertheless exists. In June 2017, in the wave of the ex-
periment, the dis&approval rule was used in a popular referendum to choose
the names of two new quarters. This referendum was organised by the city
which initiated the citizen project of realising the voting experimen: Crolles
(a neighbour city of Allevard-les-Bains).
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